How to Check if Your Cellphone Is Infected With Pegasus Spyware - (2024)

The infamous Pegasus spyware created by Israeli firm NSO can turn any infected smartphone into a remote microphone or camera. Here’s how to stay safe and know if you’ve been hacked

Next, install a set of tools for creating and working with iTunes backups:

Lastly, install MVT:

Users will receive a substantial output with information about the connected device, such as the iOS version and model type:

After that, users can set a password for the device backup:

We can also track IoCs relating to other spyware attacks from several sources, such as:

Datausage.json– check for suspicious processes.

Os_analytics_ad_daily.json– check for suspicious processes.

 "ROWID": 97, "guid": "9CCE3479-D446-65BF-6D00-00FC30F105F1", "text": "", "replace": 0, "service_center": null, "handle_id": 1, "subject": null, "country": null, "attributedBody": "", "version": 10, "type": 0, "service": "SMS", "account": "P:+66********", "account_guid": "54EB51F8-A905-42D5-832E-D98E86E4F919", "error": 0, "date": 718245997147878016, "date_read": 720004865472528896, "date_delivered": 0, "is_delivered": 1, "is_finished": 1, "is_emote": 0, "is_from_me": 0, "is_empty": 0, "is_delayed": 0, "is_auto_reply": 0, "is_prepared": 0, "is_read": 1, "is_system_message": 0, "is_sent": 0, "has_dd_results": 1, "is_service_message": 0, "is_forward": 0, "was_downgraded": 0, "is_archive": 0, "cache_has_attachments": 0, "cache_roomnames": null, "was_data_detected": 1, "was_deduplicated": 0, "is_audio_message": 0, "is_played": 0, "date_played": 0, "item_type": 0, "other_handle": 0, "group_title": null, "group_action_type": 0, "share_status": 0, "share_direction": 0, "is_expirable": 0, "expire_state": 0, "message_action_type": 0, "message_source": 0, "associated_message_guid": null, "associated_message_type": 0, "balloon_bundle_id": null, "payload_data": null, "expressive_send_style_id": null, "associated_message_range_location": 0, "associated_message_range_length": 0, "time_expressive_send_played": 0, "message_summary_info": null, "ck_sync_state": 0, "ck_record_id": null, "ck_record_change_tag": null, "destination_caller_id": "+66926477437", "is_corrupt": 0, "reply_to_guid": "814A603F-4FEC-7442-0CBF-970C14217E1B", "sort_id": 0, "is_spam": 0, "has_unseen_mention": 0, "thread_originator_guid": null, "thread_originator_part": null, "syndication_ranges": null, "synced_syndication_ranges": null, "was_delivered_quietly": 0, "did_notify_recipient": 0, "date_retracted": 0, "date_edited": 0, "was_detonated": 0, "part_count": 1, "is_stewie": 0, "is_kt_verified": 0, "is_sos": 0, "is_critical": 0, "bia_reference_id": null, "fallback_hash": "s:mailto:ais|(null)(4)<7AD4E8732BAF100ABBAF4FAE21CBC3AE05487253AC4F373B7D1470FDED6CFE91>", "phone_number": "AIS", "isodate": "2023-10-06 00:46:37.000000", "isodate_read": "2023-10-26 09:21:05.000000", "direction": "received", "links": [ "https://m.ais.co.th/J1Hpm91ix" ] },

Sms_attachments.json– check for suspicious attachments.

 "attachment_id": 4, "ROWID": 4, "guid": "97883E8C-99FA-40ED-8E78-36DAC89B2939", "created_date": 726724286, "start_date": "", "filename": "~/Library/SMS/Attachments/b8/08/97883E8C-99FA-40ED-8E78-36DAC89B2939/IMG_0005.HEIC", "uti": "public.heic", "mime_type": "image/heic", "transfer_state": 5, "is_outgoing": 1, "user_info": ", "transfer_name": "IMG_0005.HEIC", "total_bytes": 1614577, "is_sticker": 0, "sticker_user_info": null, "attribution_info": null, "hide_attachment": 0, "ck_sync_state": 0, "ck_server_change_token_blob": null, "ck_record_id": null, "original_guid": "97883E8C-99FA-40ED-8E78-36DAC89B2939", "is_commsafety_sensitive": 0, "service": "iMessage", "phone_number": "*", "isodate": "2024-01-12 03:51:26.000000", "direction": "sent", "has_user_info": true }

Webkit_session_resource_log.jsonandwebkit_resource_load_statistics.json– check for suspicious domains.

{ "domain_id": 22, "registrable_domain": "sitecdn.com", "last_seen": 1704959295.0, "had_user_interaction": false, "last_seen_isodate": "2024-01-11 07:48:15.000000", "domain": "AppDomain-com.apple.mobilesafari", "path": "Library/WebKit/WebsiteData/ResourceLoadStatistics/observations.db" }

Tcc.json– check which applications have been granted which permissions.

 "service": "kTCCServiceMotion", "client": "com.apple.Health", "client_type": "bundle_id", "auth_value": "allowed", "auth_reason_desc": "system_set", "last_modified": "2023-07-11 06:25:15.000000"

To collect data about processes, users can use XCode Instruments.

Note: Developer mode must be enabled on the iOS device.

See Also

Table of contents for July

Image 3: Showcasing XCode instruments profile selection

Process data collection:

Image 4: Process list from iPhone

Overcoming the iOS interception challenge

For the common public

iOS security architecture typically prevents normal apps from performing unauthorized surveillance. However, a jailbroken device can bypass these security measures. Pegasus and other mobile malware may exploit remote jailbreak exploits to steer clear of detection by security mechanisms. This enables operators to install new software, extract data, and monitor and collect information from targeted devices.

Warning signs of an infection on the device include:

• Slower device performance
• Spontaneous reboots or shutdowns
• Rapid battery drain
• Appearance of previously uninstalled applications
• Unexpected redirects to unfamiliar websites

This reinstates the critical importance of maintaining up-to-date devices and prioritizing mobile security. Recommendations for end-users include:

• Avoid clicking on suspicious links
• Review app permissions regularly
• Enable Lockdown mode for protection against spyware attacks
• Consider disabling iMessage and FaceTime for added security
• Always install the updated version of the iOS

For businesses: Protect against Pegasus and other APT mobile malware

Securing mobile devices, applications, and APIs is crucial, particularly when they handle financial transactions and store sensitive data. Organizations operating in critical sectors, government, and other industries are prime targets for cyberattacks such as espionage and more, especially high-level employees.

Researching iOS devices presents challenges due to the closed nature of the system.Group-IB Threat Intelligence, however, helps organizations worldwide identify cyber threats in different environments, including iOS, with our recent discovery beingGoldPickaxe.iOS– the first iOS Trojan harvesting facial scans and using them to potentially gain unauthorized access to bank accounts. Group-IB Threat Intelligence provides a constant feed on new and previously conducted cyber attacks, the tactics, techniques, and behaviors of threat actors, and susceptibility of attacks based on your organization’s risk profile— giving a clear picture of how your devices can be exploited by vectors, to initiate timely and effective defense mechanisms.

If you suspect your iOS or Android device has been compromised by Pegasus or similar spyware, turn to ourexperts for immediate support. To perform device analysis or set up additional security measures, organizations can also get in touch withGroup-IB’s Digital Forensics team for assistance. source

NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware can turn any infected smartphone into a remote microphone and camera, spying on its own owner while also offering the hacker – usually in the form of a state intelligence or law enforcement agency – full access to files, messages and, of course, the user’s location.

Pegasus is one of a number of proprietary tools sold as part of the hacker-for-hire industry – and one found at the very high-end of that dark market. Other companies offer less expensive services – for example, only providing geolocation services for its clients. So how can you protect yourself? And how can you check to see if your phone has been targeted in the past or is infected now?

Haaretz offers a simple, nontechnical explanation on how to check and stay safe…

The weakest link

Most cellphone spyware operates in a similar fashion: a message is sent to a phone with a nefarious message. The message usually contains a link that will either download the malware onto your device directly, or refer it to a website that will prompt a download – all unbeknown to the phone’s owner.

There are other ways to get your phone to download something that don’t involve a message. However, from the moment of infection, most spyware tools follow a similar protocol: once installed, the spyware contacts what is called a “command-and-control” server, which provides it with instructions remotely.

“Let’s say the Israel Police are the ones who installed Pegasus on your smartphone and they want to know where you – or, more precisely, your phone – has been in the previous 24 hours. To get that information, instructions to obtain that data are sent to a C&C server connected to the phone,” explains Dr. Gil David, a researcher and cybersecurity consultant.

Many times, the links sent to you will appear innocent. It may look like a message from the Post Office or Amazon. But don’t be fooled: Through some simple social engineering and a process called “DNS spoofing,” even an official-looking URL may be a trap.

Sadly, staying safe is not always possible.

What makes Pegasus so expensive is its ability to not just potentially infect any smartphone selected for targeting remotely, but to do so with a “zero click” infection. This means your phone can be infected without you even having to click on a link – for example, with the code instructing your phone to reach out to the server secretly encoded into a WhatsApp message or even in a file like a photo texted to you via iMessage.

These “zero click” attacks make use of what is called “zero-day” exploits: unknown loopholes in your phone’s defenses that allow these hidden bits of code to kick into action without the victim doing anything.

So, another good practice is to make sure your phone’s operating system is as updated as possible: As new exploits are discovered, they are quickly “patched” by the likes of Apple and Google.

According to digital forensics experts Amnesty International and Citizen Lab, Pegasus’ zero click infections have only been found on iPhones. “Most recently, a successful ‘zero-click’ attack has been observed exploiting multiple zero-days to attack a fully patched iPhone 12 running iOS 14.6 in July 2021,” Amnesty notes in its instructive report“How to Catch NSO Group’s Pegasus.”

It seems Pegasus’ ability to infect iPhones was based on a previously unknown loophole in the iMessage service, and this too has subsequently been patched. However, other Israel firms, for instance QuadDream, reportedly have such abilities as well.

“From 2019, an increasing amount of vulnerabilities in iOS, especially iMessage and FaceTime, started getting patched thanks to their discoveries by vulnerability researchers, or to cybersecurity vendors reporting exploits discovered in-the-wild,” Amnesty writes – so make sure your phone is updated.

Indicators of compromise

Groups like Amnesty and Citizen Lab find NSO’s spyware on phones using two different methods. Both involve searching for what is termed “indicators of compromise,” or IOCs.

Amnesty maintains a database of nefarious domains used by NSO’s clients. The list is constantly updating as more bogus URLs are found. Citizen Lab, meanwhile, also maintains a database of so-called vectors: messages sent to victims containing nefarious code or URLS. The two groups each maintain updated lists of Pegasus’ related processes that together permit attribution.

The only thing that has changed with Pegasus over the years is the way your phone is referred to the server, and the way the so-called payload is delivered.

“While SMS messages carrying malicious links were the tactic of choice for NSO Group’s customers between 2016 and 2018, in more recent years they appear to have become increasingly rare,” Amnesty wrote in itsJuly 2021 report.

The newer trend, discovered in the case of Moroccan journalistOmar Radi, who was infected with Pegasus in 2020, is what is known as “packet injection.” This means that the download order is delivered not through a message but instead through your network, in the form of a hidden command “injected” into the phone through what Amnesty describes as “tactical devices, such as rogue cell towers, or through dedicated equipment placed at the mobile operator.

“The discovery of network injection attacks in Morocco signaled that the attackers’ tactics were indeed changing. Network injection is an effective and cost-efficient attack vector for domestic use especially in countries with leverage over mobile operators,” it explained.

As NSO’s clients are state agencies, they can easily make use of the mobile infrastructure to infect phones.

Therefore, and though such injection infections can also be forced upon you, other good practices include never using free Wi-Fi; never connecting to wireless networks you do not absolutely know are secure – as these networks can easily be hacked so they infect your phone and refer it to the snooping server. Not using so-called VPNs is also advisable for the same reason.

Chances are you have not been infected with Pegasus. However, if you have cause for concern and are scared you are or were infected, there are a few options: Amnesty offers a useful, free and open source tool called the Mobile Verification Toolkit that can check a backup of your device or its logs for any IOC. The MVT will scan your iPhone’s logs for Pegasus-related processes or search your Android’s messages for nefarious links. The tool can be downloaded here. The bad news is that it requires some technical know-how and is currently devoid of a simple-to-use interface. To get it to work, you first need to make a specific type of backup of your phone, and then you need to download the program and run the code on your computer so it can scan the file you created. Running the program requires you to download Python. Luckily, the tool comes with very clear instructions, and even those unskilled in code can make use of it with a bit of effort. Furthermore, it also allows you to conduct the test yourself. A similar product is iMazing, a phone-backup platform that runs on your desktop and provides a MVT-like analysis of your device. It does not prevent infections but can check your phone for IOCs. If the best offense is defense, there’s also a growing cellphone security market. Cyberdefense firms like ZecOps offer organizations like the BBC and Fortune 2000 companies a platform that inspects phones for current infections or traces of historic attacks. ZecOps also provides this service pro bono for journalists involved in the Pegasus Project. Private users can also buy such services. For example, the Israeli-Indian security firm SafeHouse Technologies offers an app called “BodyGuard” that provides defenses for your phone, for a small price. It already has more than a million users, mostly in India. If you can’t get the Mobile Verification Toolkit to work and are reluctant to use an app, and you genuinely fear you have been targeted, you can also drop us a tip here and we at Haaretz will get you checked. source

As one of the leading commercial spyware programs, Pegasus has been used by a host of companies, governments, and other entities to collect sensitive data from individuals’ smartphones. If Pegasus is deployed on your smartphone, your sensitive data could be at risk.

Read on to learnhow to detect Pegasus spywareon your smartphone.

How to Detect Pegasus Spywareon Your Smartphone

The data privacy demands of today’s IT landscape call for robust mobile security, as more individuals rely on smartphone applications for essential day-to-day tasks.

Safeguarding your smartphone data from threats like Pegasus starts with knowing how to:

• Scan for and detect Pegasus spyware on your smartphone
• Identify Pegasus spyware installed on your smartphone
• Remove Pegasus spyware from your Android or iPhone
• Prevent Pegasus spyware from compromising your smartphone data

Dealing with advanced mobile security risks like Pegasus spyware is much easier with the help of amanaged security services provider(MSSP), who can advise onhow to detect pegasus spyware on iPhoneor Android.

What is Pegasus Spyware?

Developed by theNSO group in Israel, Pegasus is signature spyware that has been implicated in the secret surveillance of individuals worldwide. Pegasus spyware is considered dangerous because it allows an attacker to control a victim’s smartphone.

Using Pegasus spyware, a perpetrator can:

• Wiretap and listen to conversations
• Access photos and videos
• Control applications on a smartphone

It is difficult and often impossible for antivirus solutions to detect Pegasus spyware because it exploits zero-day vulnerabilities, which are unknown to the developers of these solutions.

How to Detect Pegasus Spyware

Over years of extensive research, Amnesty International has developed amethodologyto detect Pegasus spyware on smartphones, providing it to the public as a resource on Github.

Using Amnesty International’s methodology, you can find a list of:

• Domain names of Pegasus infrastructure
• Email addresses identified in previous attacks
• Process names associated with Pegasus

Beyond the indicators of Pegasus compromise methodology, Amnesty International also released aMobile Verification Toolkit(MVT) to help support users interested in detecting Pegasus spyware on their smartphones. With the help of Amnesty International’s spyware detection tools, you can learnhow to detect pegasus spyware on Androidor iPhone.

How to Detect PegasusSpywareon iOS

Here’show tocheck for pegasus spywareon iOS devicessuch as iPhones:

• Create a backup of encrypted data on a device other than your smartphone
• Once your smartphone is securely backed up, download the MVT tool onto your iPhone and follow Amnesty International’s instructions for detecting Pegasus.

Whereas other apps can detect Pegasus on iOS, it’s best to follow Amnesty International’s instructions or work with aqualified MSSPto avoid running into any issues while detecting the spyware.

How to Detect PegasusSpywareon Android

Although the MVT mostly caters to iOS devices, it can still detect Pegasus on Android.

If you are wonderinghow todetect Pegasus spyware on Androidwith the MVT, the first places to start looking are potentially malicious text messages and APKs on your smartphone.

How Pegasus Works

For most Pegasus infections, the spyware is installed remotely on victims’ smartphones. However, Pegasus can be installed physically, and, in some cases, it can use the victim’s smartphone for data storage prior to transmitting data to a remote server.

Pegasus Remote Installation

Pegasus spyware can beremotely installedon a smartphone via:

• Zero-click attacks– Zero-click exploits typically leverage applications such as Apple Music or iMessage to send requests to the victim’s smartphone. Here, the victim does not interact with the spyware and is clueless about the download of Pegasus spyware.
• Malicious text messages– A victim receives a text message containing an exploit link for aPegasus spyware download.Clicking the link deploys spyware on the victim’s smartphone.
• Network injection attack– While browsing the Internet, a victim is redirected from a clear-text HTTP website to a decoy of a legitimate business. Unknowingly, a victim may then provide access credentials or other sensitive information.

In most cases, remote installation of Pegasus spyware on victims’ phones via zero-click attacks leverages zero-day vulnerabilities, of which the smartphone manufacturer may not be aware.

This makes Pegasus spyware very dangerous to its victims, who may not realize their sensitive data is being surveilled until it is too late.

Pegasus Physical Installation

While it is uncommon, Pegasus can be installed by connecting a victim’s smartphone to another device such as a computer to deploy the spyware. However, this would involve the difficult task of accessing a victim’s smartphone without their knowledge.

Pegasus Data Management

According to NSO, the spyware will transmit data from a victim’s smartphone to a server where the attacker can access the data. However, if Pegasus is unable to send data to a server, it will transmit the data to a “hidden and encrypted buffer” within the phone’s storage.

What Data Can Pegasus Access?

Once deployed on a smartphone, Pegasus spyware can access a range of data, including:

• Text messages
• Emails
• Photos and videos
• Personal contacts
• Location
• Audio messages and recordings

Detecting Pegasus spywareon your smartphone is critical to minimizing the risks of your sensitive data being exposed by perpetrators.

Can Pegasus be Removed?

You canremove Pegasus from your smartphoneby attempting the following actions:

• Restarting your smartphone, to put a temporary stop to Pegasus
• Resetting your smartphone to its factory settings, whichmayremove Pegasus
• Updating your smartphone’s system software and apps to current versions
• Removing any unknown device connections to social media platforms

When removing Pegasus from your smartphone, it is always best to work with theMVT resourceprovided by Amnesty International. IfPegasus spyware removalbecomes difficult, consider consulting anMSSPfor help.

What to Do if You Have Pegasus

According to Reporters Without Borders(RSF), here’s what to do if you have Pegasus:

• Buy a new smartphone and stop using the one infected with Pegasus, ensuring the compromised smartphone is not close to you or your work environment.
• Change passwords for all accounts on the new smartphone and remember to sign out of the accounts on the compromised one.

If you have Pegasus, it is best to contact anexperienced MSSP, who will point you toPegasus spyware removaltools that will help remove Pegasus and keep your data safe.

Other Spyware like Pegasus

Besides Pegasus, othertypes of spywareinclude:

• Trojans, which can steal a victim’s funds or credentials to make fraudulent purchases.
• Stealware, which can intercept traffic from online shopping sites like those offering credits or rewards for purchases.

With everyone using smartphones or tablets to store sensitive information like account passwords, securing these devices from spyware and other forms of malware is paramount.

In an organizational setting, it is critical for leadership to emphasize theimportance of mobile securityin defending sensitive data stored on smartphones from various types of spyware.

How to Protect From Pegasus and Other Spyware

Protecting your organization from Pegasus and other spyware revolves around implementingmobile device security best practicessuch as:

• Encrypting any communication of sensitive data with industry-standard algorithms
• Keeping up-to-date with the latest phishing and malware attempts
• Updating your smartphone or mobile device with the latest security patches
• Using strong passwords andmulti-factor authenticationon all mobile devices
• Conducting routine penetration testing on mobile devices that contain sensitive data

If you are wonderinghow to block Pegasus spyware, some of the mobile security best practices above can help. However, it’s best to implement them with the guidance of aleading MSSP. source

The Israeli-made Pegasus spyware is suspected of infecting over 450 phones targeted by clients of NSO, who range from Saudi Arabia to Mexican drug lords. Here’s a list of the confirmed Pegasus victims.

The Israeli-made Pegasus spyware, sold by the cyberoffense firm NSO to state intelligence agencies around the world, has become infamous in recent years. Exploiting unknown loopholes in WhatsApp, iMessage and Android has allowed the group’s clients to potentially infect any smartphone and gain full access to it – in some cases without the owner even clicking or opening a file.

Digital forensics groups such as Amnesty International and the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab have revealed numerous potential targets with traces of the spyware on their phones. Last summer, Project Pegasus – led by Paris-based NGO Forbidden Stories with the help of Amnesty’s Security Lab – organized an international consortium of journalists, including Haaretz and its sister publication TheMarker, to investigate thousands of additional potential targets selected for possible surveillance byNSO Group clients worldwide.

So far, targets have been found across the world: from India and Uganda to Mexico and the West Bank, with high-profile victims including U.S. officials and a New York Times journalist.

Now, for the first time, Haaretz has assembled a list of confirmed cases involving Pegasus spyware.

Though there have been over 450 suspected hacking cases, this list, which was put together with the help of Amnesty’s Security Lab, includes only the cases in which infections were confirmed either by Amnesty or another digital forensics group like Citizen Lab (which also helped construct this list). It also includes a few instances where official bodies such as French intelligence agencies or private firms like Apple or WhatsApp have publicly confirmed attacks.

The list does not include those suspected of being targeted – for example, Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, who was reportedly sent the spyware via a WhatsApp message from no less thanSaudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Rather, it is those who have actually been found with Pegasus on their phones.

The NSO Group, which refuses to confirm the identity of its clients and claims it has no knowledge of their targets, has denied most of these cases and says digital forensic analysis cannot fully identify its software.

• How to Check if Your Cellphone Is Infected With Pegasus Spyware
• Police Use NSO’s Pegasus to Spy on Israelis Without Warrant, Report Says
• Israeli NSO Spyware Found on Phones of Jordanian, Bahraini Women’s Rights Activists

The gap between the massive list of potential targets and those who were actually infected highlights how hard it is to confirm the presence of Pegasus spyware on phones. For instance, a private investigation commissioned by Bezos himself found that his phone had received a strange message from Crown Prince Mohammed, after which the tycoon’s device began sending out a lot of data. However, Bezos was reluctant to hand his phone over to anyone other than the handpicked investigators he had hired; they said it was very likely his phone had been infected.

Here is the list of most, if not all, known and confirmed Pegasus cases. They are sorted by the nationality of the victims or their country of residence when they were targeted.

The list of confirmed cases is followed by an additional list of names of those who have been confirmed to have been targeted but whose actual infection has not been verified.

AZERBAIJAN

Khadija Ismayilova
The Azerbaijani investigative journalist based in Baku was targeted repeatedly for over three years as part of government persecution as a result of her work,the Project Pegasus investigation revealed.

Sevinc Vaqifqizi
Freelance Azerbaijanii journalist Vaqifqizi was found by Amnesty and Forbidden Stories to have had their phone infected with Pegasus in 2019 and 2020.

BAHRAIN

Moosa Abd-Ali
Moosa Abd-Ali is a Bahraini activist living in exile in London who was found to have been targeted in the past, with the Bahraini government hacking his personal computer in 2011.According to Citizen Lab, Abd-Ali’s iPhone 8 appears to have been hacked with Pegasus at some point prior to September 2020.

Yusuf al-Jamri
A Bahraini blogger who says he was tortured by his government, Yusuf al-Jamri was granted asylum in the U.K. in 2018. According to Citizen Lab, Jamri’s iPhone 7 appears to have been hacked with Pegasus at some point prior to September 2019.

Seven rights activists
At least three members of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, another three from the nonprofit Waad and one from the group Al Wefaq were also infected, Citizen Lab found. At least another seven members of BCHR and the other groups were actually targeted, but their infection was not confirmed by Citizen Lab.

EL SALVADOR

Carlos Martínez
A reporter for El Faro, he was one of over 35 journalists and members of civil society groups infected by the Pegasus spyware between July 2020 and November 2021.

Daniel Lizárraga
A Mexican journalist and the editor of El Faro, who was expelled from El Salvador. Citizen Lab found that his phne had been infected.

Nine El Faro journalists
The following journalists with El Faro were all found by Citizen Lab to have been infected by the Pegasus spyware: Gabriela Cáceres, Carlos Dada, Carlos Ernesto Martínez D’aubuisson, Julia Gavarrete (who had two phones hacked), Valeria Guzmán, Ana Beatriz Lazo, Rebeca Monge, Víctor Peña, Nelson Rauda.

El Salvadorian journalists
Citizen Lab discovered that the following journalists were also infected with Pegasus: Efren Lemus, Gabriel Labrador, José Luis Sanz, María Luz Nóchez, Mauricio Ernesto Sandoval Soriano, Óscar Martínez, Roman Gressier, Roxana Lazo, Sergio Arauz, Beatriz Benitez, Ezequiel Barrera, Xenia Oliva, an unnamed journalist from Diario El Mundo, and Daniel Reyes.

Noah Bullock
The head of Cristosal, a human rights organization based in El Salvador, who was also found by Citizen Lab to have been infected.

Ricardo Avelar
A journalist with El Diario de Hoy, Citizen Lab confirmed that his device had been infected.

Jose Marinero
An official with the activism group Fundación DTJ in El Salvador whose phone was found by Citizen Lab to have been infected.

Xenia Hernandez
Another official with the activism group Fundación DTJ in El Salvador whose phone was found by Citizen Lab to have been infected.

Oscar Luna
An activist with the digital rights group Revista Digital Disruptiva. Citizen Lab found that their phone had been infected.

Mariana Belloso
An independent journalist whose phone was found by Citizen Lab to have been infected by the Pegasus spyware.

Carmen Tatiana Marroquín
An economist and columnist whose phone was found by Citizen Lab to have been infected by the Pegasus spyware.

FINLAND

Finnish diplomats
An unknown number of Finnish diplomats stationed abroad were found to have been infected, the Finnish Foreign Ministry confirmed. Their identity was not disclosed, nor was the suspected operator.

FRANCE

Bruno Delport
The phone of the director of Parisian radio station TSF Jazz was found by Citizen Lab to have been infected in 2019, just as he was applying for the presidency of Radio France.

Lénaïg Bredoux
The investigative journalist and general editor of Mediapart was confirmed to have been infected by Pegasus. The confirmation was made by France’s computer security agency following Project Pegasus. Bredoux was involved in a story about the head of Morocco’s intelligence agency, a known NSO client.

Edwy Plenel
The investigative journalist with Mediapart was confirmed to have been infected by Pegasus. The confirmation was made by France’s computer security agency following Project Pegasus.

Unnamed France 24 journalist
A senior journalist with France 24 was confirmed to have been infected by Pegasus in May 2019, September 2020 and January 2021. That was confirmed by France’s computer security agency after Project Pegasus.

Claude Mangin
French national whose husband, Naama Asfari, is jailed in Morocco for advocating for Western Saharan independence. As part of Project Pegasus, it was found thatat least two of her phones were infected.

Arnaud Montebourg
A former minister in the government of Manuel Valls, Montebourg was targeted in 2019, most likely by Morocco, an analysis by Amnesty found. Montebourg has given testimony to ANSSI and its investigation into NSO in France.
Suspected operator: Morocco

HUNGARY

Dániel Németh
A Hungarian photojournalist involved in covering President Viktor Orbán and the country’s elites, two of his phones were infected in 2021. Direkt36, working with Citizen Lab and Amnesty’s Security Lab, confirmed the infections.

Zoltán Páva
The former Hungarian politician, now the publisher of an opposition news website, was also infected by Pegasus in March and May 2021.

Adrien Beauduin
A gender studies student at Central European University in Hungary, Beauduin was confirmed to have had his phone infected after being arrested in a protest against Orbán’s policies.

Szabolcs Panyi
The journalist with Direkt36, which was a partner in the Pegasus Project, was infected a number of times in 2019. The confirmation was made by Amnesty as part of the global investigation.

András Szabó
An investigative journalist with Direkt36, Szabó’s phone was infected a number of times in 2019. The confirmation was made by Amnesty as part of the global investigation.

Brigitta Csikász
A Hungarian journalist covering crime stories, Csikász’s phone was infected in 2019 – whichwas confirmed by Direkt36 and Amnesty.

INDIA

Jagdeep Singh Randhawa
Human rights lawyer and activist from Punjabhad his phone hacked in July and August 2019.

Mangalam Kesavan Venu
Founding editor of The Wire – a nonprofit Indian investigative journalism outlet that was part of the Project Pegasus investigation – was found to have been infected with the spyware.

Paranjoy Guha Thakurta
Investigative journalist who was looking into how the Modi government used Facebook to spread disinformation; Amnesty confirmed his phone had been infected by NSO’s spyware as part of the Project Pegasus investigation.

Prashant Kishor
Political pollster working with a number of opposition parties in India, his phone was infected in 2018, Amnesty confirmed, months before an election – in what critics say was an attempt by Modi’s party to use the spyware to collect political information.

Rona Wilson
An activist focused on minorities and prisoners’ rights, digital forensics firm Arsenal Consulting found that his phone had been infected in July 2017 and April 2018. His phone number appeared in the Project Pegasus leaks.

Syed Abdul Rahman Geelani
Geelani (also known as SAR Geelani), a Delhi University professor serving time in India for ties to an outlawed Maoist group and prisoners’ rights activist, was found by Amnesty to have been infected between 2017 and 2019.

Sushant Singh
A journalist who covered defense issues for The Indian Express, and was investigating a massive deal between India and France, was found by Amnesty to havebeen infected as part of Project Pegasus.

S.N.M. Abdi
Journalist for India’s Outlook had his phone infected by Pegasus in April 2019, May 2019, July 2019, October 2019 and December 2019, Amnestyfound as part of Project Pegasus.

Bela Bhatia
An Indian human rights lawyer whose phone was found to have been infected in 2019, and is one of five victimswho are part of WhatsApp suit against NSO.

Siddharth Varadarajan
An Indian investigative journalist who is the former editor of The Hindu and founding editor of The Wire, a Pegasus Project partner. He had his phone targeted with NSO-made spyware in April 2018. Forbidden Stories and Amnesty International’s Security Lab’s forensic analysis revealed he was successfully infected.

Unnamed legal officer
The legal officer was also confirmed to have been hacked with spywarefollowing the Project Pegasus investigation.

Ankit Grewal
The lawyer and so-called anti-caste activist was found to have been targeted in 2019 – one of a large group of victims named by WhatsApp in its suit against NSO.

Read our full story on Pegasus in India

ISRAEL

Shai Babad
A former director general of the Finance Ministry who was also a politician and also served in a senior position in Israel’s public broadcaster. Israeli business daily Calcalist said his phone had been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police. All of the Israeli cases listed beloware based on Calcalist reportingthat has yet to be confirmed or reviewed by Haaretz or international bodies.

Avi Berger
The former director general of the Communications Ministry and a witness in the ongoing Case 4000 trial against former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Calcalist reported that Berger’s phone had been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Aviram Elad
The former editor of Walla, which allegedly provided Netanyahu with better coverage in a quid pro quo involving its parent company, the telecom giant Bezeq, in Case 4000. Calcalist said his phone was infected by the Israel Police.

Iris Elovitch
The wife of Bezeq owner Shaul Elovitch; both are defendants in Case 4000. Her phone was infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police, Calcalist reported.

Keren Terner-Eyal
A former director general of the transportation and finance ministries, Terner-Eyal assumed the latter position after Babad left the role. Calcalist said her phone was infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Shlomo Filber
A former director general of the Communications Ministry, who was appointed by Netanyahu in 2015 and now serves as a key state’s witness in the Bezeq quid pro quo case. Filber was the first Israeli whose name was published by Calcalist as having been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Miriam Feirberg
The mayor of Netanya, who was suspected of corruption and investigated by the police until her case was closed in 2019. Calcalist said her phone had been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Stella Handler
The former CEO of Bezeq, was said by Calcalist to have been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police. Handler is part of Case 4000.

Yair Katz
The chairman of the workers union at Israel Aerospace Industries and son of former Likud lawmaker Haim Katz was said by Calcalist to have been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Rami Levy
A prominent Israeli businessman famous for his low-cost supermarket chain who also owns a small telecom firm. Calcalist reported that his phone was infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police. He was investigated by the police in the past.

Topaz Luk
A former adviser to Netanyahu who is considered close to his son, Yair Netanyahu, and served a number of roles in past campaigns. He is also credited with key aspects of the then-prime minister’s media strategy. Calcalist said Luk’s phone had been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Dudu Mizrahi
The CEO of Bezeq, who took over the telecom company after Handler. Calcalist said his device was infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Avner Netanyahu
The youngest son of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Calcalist reported that Avner Netanyahu’s phone had been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Emi Palmor
A jurist and former director general of the Justice Ministry who currently serves on Facebook’s Advisory Board. Calcalist reported that his phone had been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Yaakov Peretz
The mayor of Kiryat Ata, who was suspected of corruption in 2019 and investigated by the police until the case was closed in 2020. Calcalist reported that his phone had been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Moti Sasson
The six-term mayor of the Tel Aviv suburb of Holon was another mayor whose phone was infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police, according to Calcalist.

Ilan Yeshua
The CEO of the news website Walla, which allegedly provided Netanyahu with better coverage in a quid pro quo involving its parent company Bezeq. Yeshua is also part of Case 4000 and was infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police. Calcalist reported.

Jonatan Urich
A former adviser to Benjamin Netanyahu and considered close to his son, Yair. He served a number of roles in various electoral campaigns and is credited with key aspects in Netanyahu’s media strategy. Urich, whose phone was hacked by Israeli police as part of an investigation, was also said by Calcalist to have been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Walla journalists
As part of Case 4000, a number of journalists with the news site were said by Calcalist to have been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police.

Protest leaders
The leaders of three protest movements were said by Calcalist to have been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police. The protest movements targeted were: Israelis with disabilities; Israelis of Ethiopian descent; and heads of the anti-Netanyahu protests. The first were fighting for better rights, the second demonstrated against police violence and the third sought to oust Netanyahu.

Extreme settlers
A number of extreme settlers were said by Calcalist to have been infected with Pegasus by the Israel Police ahead of the evacuations of illegal outposts.

Read our full story on Pegasus in Israel

JORDAN

Hala Ahed Deeb
Jordanian human rights lawyer, unionizer and feminist activist was found by Front Line Defendersto have been infected with Pegasus since March 2021.

Ahmed al-Neimat
A rights activist focused on workers rights and combating corruption. He works with a reform group called Hirak and has been targeted in the past, facing arrest for “insulting the king” and even a travel ban.Front Line DefendersandCitizen Lab foundhis phone was hacked at the end of January 2021, likely through the FORCEDENTRY exploit,making him the earliest victim of that particular method. His phone was likely hacked using the exploit’s zero-click capabilities.

Suhair Jaradat
A rights activist and journalist focused on women’s rights in Jordan and the Arab world who serves on the executive committee of the International Federation for Journalists. She was hacked six times between February and December 2021, through the FORCEDENTRY exploit in iPhones. The last hack took place after Apple had patched the breach, informed potential victims across the world and sued NSO. Jaradat did not update her phone and was thus still exposed.

Malik Abu Orabi
A rights lawyer who works with prominent Jordanian unions and was previously arrested by the state for his efforts. He was hacked at least 21 times between August 2019 and July 2021.

Anonymous journalist
A female journalist was also hacked, Front Line Defenders and Citizen Lab found. She requested to remain anonymous.

Read our full story on Pegasus in Jordan

KAZAKHSTAN

Aizat Abilseit, Dimash Alzhanov and Tamina Ospanova
Three members of the opposition group Wake Up, Kazakhstan whose phones were found by Amnesty’s Security Lab to have been infected by Pegasus in June 2021. Apple also warned them about the hack, which it attributed to a “state-sponsored attacker.”

Darkhan Sharipov
The Kazakh activist’s phone was also found by Amnesty to have been infected by Pegasus in June 2021.
Suspected operator:Kazakhstan

Read our full story on Pegasus in Kazakhstan

LEBANON

Lama Fakih
Human Rights Watch’s crisis and conflict director also heads the group’s Beirut office. She was targeted with Pegasus spyware at least five times between April and August 2021, HRW and Amnesty International’s Security Lab found.
Suspected operator:Unknown

Read our full story

MOROCCO

Hicham Mansouri
Freelance investigative journalist and co-founder of the Moroccan Association of Investigative Journalists had his iPhone infected with Pegasus more than 20 times between February and April 2021, the Project Pegasus investigation revealed. Mansouri fled Morocco in 2016 and is now based in Paris.

Mahjoub Mleiha
Human rights activist from Western Sahara who is active in the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders, now lives in Belgium, where he is also a citizen. Amnesty found that his phone had been infected.

Joseph Breham
A French lawyer who is involved in a lawsuit against Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed over claims of torture and inhumane treatment in Yemen. Amnesty confirmed that his phone had been infected with Pegasus using the same type of messagesother alleged victims in Morocco also received.

Oubi Buchraya Bachir
Sahrawi diplomat who has served as its representative in a number of African countries. Amnesty confirmed as part of Project Pegasus that his phone was infected.

Maati Monjib
Founder of the Moroccan Association for Investigative Journalism and the NGO Freedom Now (dedicated to protecting the rights of journalists and writers), Amnesty found thathis phone had been infected in 2019.

Omar Radi
An independent, award-winning Moroccan journalist whose phone wasfound by Amnesty to have been infected in 2019.

Aboubakr Jamaï
Jamaï is a journalist who has long inspired the ire of Morocco’s royal family. Citizen Lab together withAccess Now foundhis phone had been infected with Pegasus after materials on it were leaked online in an attempt to tarnish Jamaï and his associates.

Fouad Abdelmoumni
A Moroccan human rights and democracy activist who works with Human Rights Watch and Transparency International Morocco, Abdelmoumni’s phone was found to have been infected, most likely by the Moroccan intelligence services. Citizen Lab investigated the hacking after being commissioned by WhatsApp.
Suspected operator:Morocco

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (WEST BANK)

Ghassan Halaika
Human rights activist working for Al-Haq, a Palestinian NGO blacklisted by Israel, whose phone was infected in July 2020. The confirmation was made by human rights organization Front Line Defenders.

Ubai Aboudi
The phone of the director of the Bisan Center for Research and Development, a Palestinian NGO blacklisted by Israel, was infected in 2020 and confirmed by Front Line Defenders.

Salah Hammouri
Lawyer and researcher with the Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, a Palestinian NGO blacklisted by Israel, whose phone was infected in 2020, according to Front Line Defenders.

Three unnamed activists
Phones of three activists working with Palestinian NGOs blacklisted by Israel were infected in 2020, and confirmed by Front Line Defenders.

Suspected operator in all six cases:Israel

Read our full story on Pegasus in the West Bank

POLAND

Krzysztof Brejza
Polish senator and member of the opposition party Civic Platform whose phone was confirmed to have been infected over 30 times in 2019. The confirmation was made by Citizen Lab and reported by AP.

Roman Giertych
A lawyer who has represented leaders of Brejza’s Civic Platform party in sensitive cases, and was confirmed to have been infected over 10 times in 2019. The confirmation was made by Citizen Lab.

Ewa Wrzosek
The phone of the prosecutor and critic of the ruling Law and Justice party’s attempt to undermine Poland’s judiciary was confirmed to have been infected a number of times in 2019. The confirmation was made by Citizen Lab after she received a notification from Apple warning that her phone had been hacked.

Michal Kolodziejczak
The agrarian social movement leader was hacked several times in May 2019 ahead of a fall election in which Kolodziejczak was hoping to have his group, AGROunia, become a formal political party. Courts have so far blocked his efforts to form a political party.

Tomasz Szwejgiert
An author and collaborator with Polish secret services who found himself at odds with powerful figures was hacked while co-authoring a book about the head of Poland’s secret services, Mariusz Kaminski. He was hacked 21 times with Pegasus from late March to June 2019.

Suspected operator in all cases:Poland

Read our full story on Pegasus in Poland

RWANDA

Carine Kanimba
A U.S.-Belgian citizen, Kanimba is the daughter of Rwandan activist Paul Rusesabagina, who was arrested and forcibly returned to the country. Her father’s plight inspired the 2004 movie “Hotel Rwanda” and she was confirmed by Amnesty to have been hacked at the start of 2021.

Peter Verlinden
The Belgian journalist stationed in Africa has worked for the national Flemish broadcaster VTR. Belgian intelligence services and Amnesty found that his phone had been infected in September, October and November 2020.

Marie Bamutese
The phone of Peter Verlinden’s wife was also found to have been hacked. This was confirmedby Belgium’s General Intelligence and Security Service.

Placide Kayumba
A Rwandan activist and member of the opposition in exile, Kayumba was found to have been targeted as part of an investigation by Citizen Lab commissioned by WhatsApp into hacking of its clients.
Suspected operator:Rwanda

SAUDI ARABIA

Hatice Cengiz
The Turkish national was the fiancée of the late Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi, and her phone was infected a few days after her partner was murdered at the Saudi Embassy in Istanbul in October 2018 – as revealed by Amnesty as part of Pegasus Project.

Omar Abdulaziz
A close friend of Khashoggi’s, Abdulaziz’s phone was infected with Pegasus in the months before the Saudi dissident’s murder in 2018, CItizen Lab found. Based in Canada,he has filed a lawsuit against NSO in Israel.

Wadah Khanfar
Al Jazeera’s former director general and another close friend of Khashoggi, Amnesty found that his phone was infected as recently as July 2021.

Ragip Soylu
A Turkish journalist who heads Middle East Eye’s bureau in Ankara.Amnesty confirmed that his phone was infectedseveral times between February and July 2021.

Ben Hubbard
The phone of the New York Times journalistwas confirmed by Citizen Labto have been infected between June 2018 to June 2021 while he was based in Lebanon, reporting on Saudi Arabia and writing a book about Crown Prince Mohammed.

Suspected operator in all cases:Saudi Arabia

Read our full story on Pegasus in Saudi Arabia

TOGO

Father Pierre Marie-Chanel Affognon
A Catholic priest from Togo who is an anti-corruption activist fighting for constitutional and electoral reform in the West African country. An investigation by Citizen Lab commissioned by WhatsApp into the hacking of its clients found his phone was infected.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Alaa al-Siddiq
Executive director of ALQST, a nonprofit advocating for human rights in the UAE and the Gulf region. Her phone was found to have been infected a number of times from 2015, when she was living in Qatar (where she had moved to flee persecution), and up until 2019, when she had relocated to Britain. She died in a car crash in 2021. Citizen Lab made the hacking confirmation.

Abdulaziz Alkhamis
The former editor of Al Arab, Alkhamis was hacked as part of a showcase NSO organized for the UAE. According to a lawsuit filed on behalf of Alkhamis, the UAE, which were already NSO clients from 2014, were offered an expensive upgrade of the Pegasus spyware. To show the new product’s value,NSO emailed two audio recordings of Alkhamis to Emerati officials, the New York Times reported in 2018.

Ayman Nour
Egyptian dissident, 2005 Egyptian presidential candidate and opposition activist. Citizen Lab found his phone had beeninfected by Pegasus, as well as an additional spywarecalled Predator – which was developed by NSO competitor Cytrox.
Suspected operator:UAE

Rania Dridi
A journalist with Alaraby TV, she had her phone infected at least six times during 2020, as confirmed by Citizen Lab.

Tamer Almisshal
Investigative journalist for Al Jazeera in Arabic who has covered the Gulf region extensively, including the Khashoggi killing. His phone was infected in 2020, Citizen Lab confirmed.

Ebtisam al-Saegh
Bahraini human rights activist focused on women’s rights. Front Line Defenders found thather phone was hacked at least eight timesbetween August and November 2019. Saegh had been arrested in Bahrain for her activism in the past and has faced persecution for her work.

34 Al Jazeera staffers
The phones of 34 other journalists, producers, anchors and executives at Al Jazeera were confirmed to have been infected in 2020, Citizen Lab reported.
Suspected operator:Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and/or the UAE

UNITED KINGDOM

David Haigh
Thehuman rights lawyer and LGBTQ activistwho represented Princess Latifa of Dubai was the first British target confirmed to have been infected by Pegasus. He supplied Amnesty with his phone in the wake of Project Pegasus.

Anas Altikriti
Muslim anti-war activist based in the U.K. whose phone was confirmed to have been infected with Pegasus. His interfaith thinktank, the Cordoba Foundation, has been accused of maintaining ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.Suspected operator:UAE

UNITED STATES

11 unnamed U.S. officials
Eleven officials with the U.S. State Department in Ugandawere confirmed to have been hacked with Pegasus. The revelation led to a U.S. Department of Commerce decision last November to blacklist NSO.
Suspected operator:Uganda or Rwanda

LIST OF THOSE WHO HAVE ALSO BEEN TARGETED BY PEGASUS:

Ahmed Mansoor (Emirati human rights activist)

Rafael Cabrera (Mexican journalist)

Dr. Simon Barquera (Mexican researcher)

Alejandro Calvillo (Mexican whistleblower)

Luis Encarnación (Mexican activist)

Karla Micheel Salas (Mexican human rights lawyer)

David Peña (Mexican human rights lawyer)

Carmen Aristegui (Mexican journalist)

Emilio Aristegui (son of Carmen Aristegui)

Sebastián Barragán (Mexican journalist)

Carlos Loret de Mola (Mexican journalist)

Salvador Camarena (Mexican journalist)

Daniel Lizárraga (Mexican journalist)

Mario E. Patrón (Mexican human rights activist)

Stephanie Brewer (U.S. human rights activist working in Mexico)

Santiago Aguirre (Mexican human rights activist)

Juan Pardinas (Mexican anti-corruption activist)

Juan Pardinas’s wife

Alexandra Zapata (Mexican journalist)

Azam Ahmed (Former New York Times bureau chief for Mexico)

Ricardo Anaya Cortés (Mexican lawyer/politician)

Sen. Roberto Gil Zuarth (Mexican senator)

Fernando Rodríguez Doval (Mexican politician)

Claudio X. González (Mexican anti-corruption activist)

GIEI investigation (Mexican probe into mass disappearances)

Ghanem Almasarir (Saudi dissident)

Yahya Assiri (Saudi activist)

Unnamed Amnesty International employee

Abdessadak El Bouchattaoui (Moroccan journalist)

Griselda Triana (Mexican journalist)

Nihalsing Rathod (Indian human rights lawyer)

Priyanka Gandhi Vadra (General secretary, Indian National Congress)

Santosh Bhartiya (Indian journalist)

Shubhranshu Choudhary (Indian peace activist)

Unnamed U.K. lawyer

Shalini Gera (Indian lawyer)

Degree Prasad Chauhan (Indian human rights activist)

Anand Teltumbde (Indian activist)

Ashish Gupta (Indian activist)

Seema Azad (Indian activist)

Vivek Sundara (Indian activist)

Saroj Giri (Indian activist)

Sidhant Sibal (Indian journalist)

Rajeev Sharma (Indian journalist)

Rupali Jadhav (Indian activist)

Jagdish Meshram (Indian lawyer)

Alok Shukla (Indian activist)

Ajmal Khan (Indian research scholar)

Balla Ravindranath (Indian lawyer/activist)

Mandeep Singh (Indian activist)

P. Pavana (Indian, daughter of activist P. Varavara Rao)

Arunank (Indian law graduate)

Smita Sharma (Indian journalist)

Hanan Elatr (wife of Jamal Khashoggi)

Jorge Carrasco (Mexican journalist)

Álvaro Delgado Gómez (Mexican journalist)

Princess Latifa al Maktoum (daughter of the prime minister of the UAE)

Princess Haya bint Hussein (estranged wife of the prime minister of the UAE)

Juan Mayer (aerial photographer who recorded Princess Latifa’s skydives)

Lynda Bouchikhi (Princess Latifa’s officially sanctioned chaperone)

Sioned Taylor (friend of Princess Latifa)

Martin Smith (head of U.K. private security firm hired by Princess Haya)

Shimon Cohen (British PR expert)

Ross Smith (head of investigations at U.K. private security firm hired by Princess Haya)

John Gosden (British horse trainer, friend of Princess Haya)

Aisha bint Hussein (half sister of Princess Haya)

Stuart Page (British private investigator)

K.K. Sharma (former Indian Border Security Force chief)

Jagdish Maithani (Indian Border Security Force officer)

Jitendra Kumar Ojha (former Indian espionage officer)

Jitendra Kumar Ojha’s wife

Col. Mukul Dev (former Indian army officer)

Rupesh Kumar Singh (Indian journalist)

Rupesh Kumar Singh’s wife

Devirupa Mitra (Indian diplomatic correspondent)

Vijaita Singh (Indian journalist)

Bishop Benoit Alowonou (Togolese clergyman)

Elliott Ohin (Togolese opposition figure)

Raymond Houndjo (Togolese opposition figure)

Roger Torrent (Catalan parliamentary speaker)

A Complete (Updating) List of Individuals Targeted With Pegasus Spyware Plus 1,400 other potential targets who WhatsApp believes were hacked.

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